Migrants as educators: reversing the order of beneficence

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ABSTRACT
The discussion of migrants’ education focuses generally on whether and how host countries should educate their migrant populations, examining the goals and moral principles underlying educational services for immigrants. While apparently innocuous, such formulations of the issue stipulate a framework with clear roles: host countries are posited as providers and immigrants as recipients of services. Host countries are, thus, placed in a hierarchical position of ‘granting’ belonging, ‘granting’ services, ‘granting’ education, as benefactors, whether for the purposes of duty, utility, or justice. In this paper, I challenge this unidirectional order of beneficence. I propose that the inclusion of migrants in public institutions should more properly be viewed (also) as providing a necessary good/service for the host communities. The encounter with the alien, the foreign, the migrant, in oneself and in one’s world, forces individuals and communities to reflect on what and who they are as well as what and who they want to be – their identity and their future development. I argue that migrant populations with diverse linguistic traditions and customs are uniquely situated to bring to consciousness and help denaturalize the given traditions and culture of their host communities and thus make possible a more self-aware, informed, and freer path of development for their host countries.

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The artist’s object is to appear strange and even surprising to the audience … Everyday things are thereby raised above the level of the obvious and automatic … The efforts in question are directed to playing in such a way that the audience was hindered from simply identifying itself with the characters in the play. Acceptance or rejection of their actions and utterances was meant to take place on a conscious plane, instead of, as hitherto, in the audience’s subconscious.  
Bertolt Brecht

Introduction: a hierarchical reversal

Education of migrants, the topic of this special issue, implicates a specific economy of beneficence – the host state is the provider of educational services and immigrants are the recipients. Hence, the migrants are unmistakably posited as people who are in need – in need of work, of better life conditions, of the possibility of a future for their children. One hears that immigrants are ‘desperate for any job to support their families,’ ‘hopeful of a better future,’ and ‘envious of our way of life.’ Host countries, which formally or informally
accept the migrants, sometimes under the auspices of humanitarian reasons, as with refu-
gees and asylum seekers, and sometimes as guest workers for (cheaper) labor, are posited as benefactors, as having what migrants need. These countries represent the land of opportunity, land of plenty, land of justice and freedom, and, most saliently, they claim to be the owners and providers of these coveted goods.

This asymmetrical framework contains several theoretically and practically suspect assumptions. First of all, the hierarchy between the host country and the migrant populations echoes the long history of asymmetrical relations of power, in which people and cultures in positions of power legitimize their privilege through situating themselves as providers. Second, migration is a constant, not a problem or phenomenon specific to the present; and not all migrants are created equal: those who move from developed countries to developing or under-developed countries commonly refer to themselves as ‘ex-pats’ rather than migrants, emphasizing their privilege and apparent free choice in migrating to their host country. Third, migrant populations do not drastically differ from host populations in terms of their hopes and aspirations as the natives of the host country are often as much beneficiaries as the migrants. While people who migrate are classified as being the ones who need work, better life conditions, and services that prepare them for a successful future, the native population of the host country also needs these goods and services. Although circumstances may be more complicated in the case of refugees and asylum seekers, the recent Black Lives Matter movement in the United States, to mention only one, demonstrates that seeking conditions of justice and equality is not unique to refugees from underdeveloped countries. Challenging the stereotype of the ‘needy migrant’ also raises a related problem: who or what qualifies the host country as the alleged land of plenty, the provider, if its own population is in many ways on the same footing as the immigrants? Besides, host states are hardly beneficent providers to immigrants. Services are either not available (e.g. language assistance), or not free (e.g. health care), or accessing services might put the individual in legal jeopardy (e.g. driver’s licenses). The image of the state as the beneficent provider is as much a stereotype as the ‘needy migrant.’ In sum, while issues surrounding immigration in general are burdened by this hierarchical framework, such descriptions tell only a partial story as they dismiss both the global responsibility for the conditions that bring people to such desperation as well as the precarious economic conditions of millions of native citizens in the host countries themselves.

Putting some of these complications aside, once migrants are part of the economic or territorial structure of the host country, the issues, problems, and tensions are many, such as taxation, representation, communication, education, citizenship, assimilation, and one might expect that the migrant communities would have a voice in the handling of these matters. However, yet again, it is the host country that is in a position of asymmetrical power, making unilateral decisions about what services are appropriate to provide for immigrant populations. Especially when the topic is education, and the issue is whether and how to educate the migrants, e.g. whether education is geared towards helping them with integration, assimilation, job training, etc., or, alternatively, whether migrants as human beings simply deserve educational services in their host countries (as a matter of justice), the wording of the issue clearly stipulates who the ‘givers’ and ‘takers’ are. Framing the conversation over migrants’ education this way situates host countries and cultures in the hierarchical position of ‘granting’ belonging, ‘granting’
services, ‘granting’ education, that is, as benefactors, and allows no space for acknowledging the contributions of migrants to their host countries. I challenge this hierarchy and argue that the migrants’ contribution to their host countries is not merely economic, but rather fundamental for the free self-development of host cultures, and, thus, ‘migrants’ education’ should be viewed not only as a service host countries owe or charitably grant to immigrant populations but also as one essential value the host communities receive from the inclusion of migrants in their midst.

There is a strong case to be made on behalf of the rights of migrants on Enlightenment principles, such as the dignity of human beings, and the equal respect that is due each and every person simply because she or he is a person. According to such lofty ideals, the contingency of one’s birth should not matter: each person deserves to be treated with dignity, and thus should be provided the rights and opportunities owed a person. Such universalism may be rationally and ethically sound, but it lacks persuasive force. Especially now, at a time when nativism and nationalism seem again to be on the rise, my argument presents an alternative case in favor of continued acceptance of migrants and of support for them to make a life in their host countries.

This alternative perspective is achievable by stepping outside of the traditional opposing approaches of (1) a republican nativist position, which sees national identity as the constitutive identity of its citizens, and (2) a liberal democratic one, which envisions a broader, universal concept of humanity as underlying personal identity. Usually the arguments of the one side are immune to those of the other, since their grounding premises are incompatible. For a liberal democrat, grounding immigration policies on arguments that rely on cultural purity or unity ignores the already diverse and mixed cultures that make up so many communities globally. For nativists, or a citizens-first type of mentality, reasoning on the basis of universal human rights, or equal dignity of humans, are of no use since national self-determination is what is primarily at stake and reference to objective universal principles is tenuous. The universalist position takes its force from a concept of freedom and actuality of human self-determination and development that extends to humanity as such, transcending boundaries of nation and culture. The nationalist position, denying the actuality or theoretical basis of such self-determination, leaves humanity to be a general designation that lacks reference or substantive content.

However, even national self-determination requires the migrant, the foreign and alien other and acknowledging this takes the conversation beyond the universalist vs. particularist dilemma and posits immigration as a good compatible with both perspectives. Genuine free development, for persons as well as peoples, requires more than a passive acceptance of their cultural givens, their upbringing and traditions. It requires a critical reflection on their heritage and identity. Individual persons, cultures, and nations develop through encounters with others, i.e. particulars that are not easily subsumed into their accepted and familiar categories. For an individual, this may be a wayward desire that pushes the individual to become aware of and question her framework of appropriate behavior. Only through such an opportunity to question will she reflectively affirm or modify the framework of her values. For a community, it could be the demand for a new policy, a strange act, or unusual mode of existence, which similarly exposes given and accepted norms as choices, challenging the community members to reconsider their implicit commitments. Although such encounters with particulars that are not easily subsumable to a culture’s or individual’s accepted or familiar categories do not have to
originate from interaction with foreign others, migrants, or, as they are referred to in the U.S., ‘aliens,’ differences of linguistic tradition and historical customs work well to wake the host communities from the slumber of their second nature. This second nature is the collection of that which is traditional and customary, the habits and daily practices that come to replace the merely animal nature of human beings in the process of socialization. Migrants offer their host communities an opportunity to encounter beliefs, values, actions, and habits that are not easily classifiable through their given cultural frameworks.

Thus, free and genuine self-development is not threatened but rather supported by the inclusion of migrant populations in host countries. First, living with migrants educates individuals to an awareness of their socialization, effectively denaturalizing their ethical life as the result of a historical and contingent path of cultural development. Thus, and second, it allows individuals a more self-conscious choice for their future self-development, effectively freeing them from unconscious and subconscious bonds of tradition and community. This perspective of migrants’ education – reversing the order of beneficence and allowing for migrants to be the teachers and benefactors to a host community, who receives the gift of their challenge and instruction – transcends the boundaries of the traditional terms of migration debates. This modified framework offers a resolution to the stalemate between left and right voices addressing the issues of immigration policies and rights of immigrants.

To make this case, I turn to Hegel, a philosopher who addresses the concept of self-determination in its many guises as the central focus of his system. Hegel carefully develops and analyzes both pure concepts and real expressions of identity and difference, otherness, and freedom and studies self-determination at multiple registers: the individual, communal, national, and global. He is, thus, an excellent resource for understanding the role of the other / the different in a culture’s education – both in its identity formation and in its historical development and self-determination. In the following, I begin with a brief account of Hegel’s discussion of self-determination and education in the Philosophy of Right. I identify a tension in the concept of Bildung as cultural formation as it may refer to education as enculturation as well as education as developing the perfectibility of human spirit. Then I turn to Hegel’s Philosophy of History to present his argument that free cultural development requires the mediation of a foreign other. In the next section, I discuss Mill, who emphasizes the significance of diversity and dialogue in his treatment of individuality, and Dewey, who emphasizes the goal of integration and assimilation in his account of democratic education, to identify the differences between my approach and these liberal theories. Finally, as I argue against integration and assimilation as well as mere valorization of difference as ultimate goals in multicultural societies, I find that I need to fine-tune my position and differentiate it from the call for a culture of debate, à la Carlos Fraenkel’s plea for a ‘clash of cultures’. Situating my position with respect to these diverse contributions, I make the case that the migrant populations serve a key role in the identity formation and cultural development of their host countries. I end my essay with a call for fostering intellectual empathy through a shared public life with migrants – for situating and practicing the political in the local.

**Education and freedom: denaturalizing second nature**

As part of a community, a person’s identity is always already shaped by the community’s values, manners, and taboos. In his Philosophy of Right, Hegel comments that
in an ethical community [einem sittlichen Gemeinwesen], it is easy to say what someone must do and what the duties are which he has to fulfill in order to be virtuous. He must simply do what is prescribed, expressly stated, and known to him within his situation (Hegel 1991a, §150).

Socialization into ethical life is a process of cultural formation and consists of, on the one hand, one’s familial and communal bringing up [Erziehung] and, on the other hand, one’s formal schooling and public education [Bildung]. Thus, we can speak of education in two senses: 1) as referring to the activities of enculturation, which give human beings a second-nature and a training in tradition, and 2) as referring to activities of intellectual growth, through schooling and conscious and reflective self-development. Activities of enculturation include learning of a language, knowing how to navigate interpersonal physical space, communicating through gestures, understanding institutions and their place and hierarchy in the social order. Enculturation takes place in the family, in the immediate community, and also in the public institutions related to children’s education and socialization. From transparent rituals, such as reciting the Pledge of Allegiance, to trivial games, such as identifying state license plates, informal and formal education familiarize children and young adults with a certain ‘way of life’ so as to prepare them for participation in civil society. Terry Pinkard explains Hegel’s concept of Bildung by pointing out that for an individual to participate in civil society,

the person has to become “educated” in terms of the German Bildung. He is not merely to acquire technical skills (reading, writing, adding, subtracting) or merely general knowledge (such as history) but also to acquire the right emotional responses and proper aesthetic taste (Pinkard 2017, 312–313).

This characterization of Bildung as the training towards personhood summarizes well the all-encompassing nature of ethical life. For Hegel, the ethical [das Sittliche] is the ‘general mode of behavior’ of the people, and it ‘appears as custom [Sitte]; and the habit of the ethical appears as a second nature which takes the place of the first, purely natural will’ (Hegel 1991a, §151). Hegel characterizes, thus, this socialization process as the adoption of a second nature. As human beings are immersed in culture, in their familial upbringing and schooling, and later in civil society as adults, they are no longer merely natural beings determined by biological impulses and drives, but they take on a second nature. The acquisition of the habits of socialized behavior, i.e. the customs, is the overcoming of a given animal nature and taming of it through language and thought, which bring humans to the level of universality. This process is properly called the cultivation of a second nature since it replaces the givenness of animal nature (one that is no longer accessible to us human beings) and becomes the foundation and horizon of future human development. In this sense, the concept of second nature does not merely refer to the (unreflective) givenness of a cultural lifeworld but also signals the overcoming of a merely animal nature that is determined by instinct and circumstances alone. The ethical ‘is the all-pervading soul, significance, and actuality of individual existence. It is spirit living and present as a world, and only thus does the substance of spirit begin to exist as spirit’ (Hegel 1991a, §151). To live as a human, as spirit, as opposed to a mere animal, means to determine oneself. Only in the actualization of second nature, in the social and political institutions of ethical life (public works, laws, educational institutions, estates and other organizing structures of society), can individuals recognize the affectivity and effects of their free self-determination.
Hence, later on, Hegel assigns more explicitly such a role of critical self-reflection and self-overcoming to education: ‘The question of the perfectibility and education [Bildung] of the human race,’ Hegel argues at the end of The Philosophy of Right, is to have “Know Thyself” as the law of its being, and, as it comprehends what it is, to assume a higher shape than that in which its being originally consisted. But for those who reject this thought, spirit has remained an empty word, and history has remained a superficial play of contingent and allegedly “merely human” aspirations and passions (Hegel 1991a, §343 Remark).

Education, thus, in this second sense of perfectibility does not take the beliefs, values, practices of everyday life as well as the hierarchy and order of social and political existence for granted, but aims at giving an account of the way things are. It is open to progress only insofar as it does not automatically accept the default state of societal institutions but asks for explanations and reasons. Such questioning brings with it at least the possibility of, but perhaps also a desire for self-overcoming.

Hegel uses the very term Bildung to speak of both the adoption of a second nature and the practice of its active overcoming, blurring the strict distinction between enculturation and perfectibility. How, though, can the very background of identity-formation and belonging be simultaneously the instrument or depository of critical reflection that makes progressive change possible? How does education as enculturation into a second nature, which requires submission to customs and rules, enable irreverence and capacity of revision and change? If spirit, as the collective life and creations of human beings, is indeed self-determining, then it must be always in the process of making itself. This process implies both renewed reflection on spirit’s self-understanding and its subsequent modifications of its actualizations, in institutions and cultural life. If communities unreflectively accept their institutions and ideologies, they live under an external authority and cannot be said to be truly self-determining. For those institutions and choices to be willed by spirit in its various forms, a dynamic for critical evaluation must be inscribed into the activity of self-determination. Hegel’s discussion of the development of spirit in his Philosophy of History (1956) provides such an account of the role of critical reflection in the self-determination of spirit. Hegel argues there that the greatest achievement of culture is to be found in its self-reflection, i.e. the culture’s recognizing its products as the results of its own historical self-determination:

The highest point in the development [Bildung] of a people is this – to have gained a conception of its life and condition – to have reduced its laws, its ideas of justice and morality to a science … In its work it is employed in rendering itself an object of its own contemplation; but it cannot develop itself objectively in its essential nature, except in thinking itself (Hegel 1956, 93).

It is through this active comparison and measuring of their self-conscious ends with the achievements of their culture and political system that a people is able to ‘think itself,’ to understand their identity as a people and their present as self-determined. And it is also such an understanding that allows them to further develop, to overcome the contradictions of their reality, and freely determine themselves. This dynamic is as true of individuals and communities as it is for nations (or peoples [Völker]), and finally for world spirit, or humanity as such. Hegel himself emphasizes the multiple registers at which self-determination is at work by pointing out that ‘[t]he principles of the successive
phases of Spirit that animate the Nations in a necessitated gradation, are themselves only steps in the development of the one universal Spirit, which through them elevates and completes itself to a self-comprehending totality’ (Hegel 1956, 78). Upon this universalist and dare I say cosmopolitan account it is possible to emphasize the significance of the ‘other’ in the development of humanity, both as an idea and as an actuality: ‘Hegel envisions a world culture governed by historical openness to the ‘other,’ an openness entailing great risk but also great rewards. Hegel conceives a historical foundation of free social and political praxis’ (Ahlers 1984, 162).

This tension between enculturation and perfectibility at the core of Hegel’s account of culture and education is a productive motor of change and development. Hegel’s account of education, in both its senses, shows that self-determination requires that communities and individuals, first become aware of their immersion in a contingent, i.e. historically situated, ethical life, and then, second, that they have good reasons for keeping, modifying, or overhauling their default beliefs and values and thus truly choosing to develop in a certain direction. I argue that a mediating force is required to open up the traditional, that which is second nature, to critical reflection and thus ensure that its continuing development is truly an exercise of freedom. Such a mediating force is found in the encounter with a foreign culture, with people who do not share the immediacy of a community’s lifeworld, or as Hegel would put it, its spiritual training, or ethical life [Sittlichkeit]. While Hegel’s analysis of the role of ‘the other’ in the making of ‘the one’, on the development of identity, or practice of freedom, has been the subject of much Hegel scholarship, my analysis below focuses on Hegel’s treatment of ‘otherness’ in the case of the encounter with the foreign or alien culture. How does that encounter factor in the development of a nation’s culture, as well as in the development of a sense of universality of human spirit?

**A hegelian account of the role of the Alien [Fremden]: humanity’s self-determination**

Hegel’s discussion of the development of ‘German identity’ in his *Philosophy of History* offers an unexpected account of the necessity of the ‘alien other’ in the free development of a people (community or nation). Hegel is often accused of a quietist position regarding political actuality, and his famous Doppelsatz has been interpreted as a defense of the Prussian state as the actualization of the principle of freedom, marking the end of history. Moreover, Hegel is criticized for the condescending and eliminating analysis he gives of Oriental and African culture in his depiction of the phases of World History. His narrative of historical progress sets up the non-Western and non-Northern cultures as barely cultures, as constituting the ‘childhood of history,’ hardly worthy of mention in the self-determination of humanity (Hegel 1956, 122). So, given all this baggage, it is remarkable to find out that the person generally taken to be a spokesperson of German greatness actually speaks of the barbarism of the German nation and charts out the process of its education and development through its alien other.

Hegel paints the early Germanic tribes as living according to the rule of the heart, as barbaric, and as devoid of ‘culture.’ But at the same time, in the development of German culture, he finds a unique element that is significant for his analysis of self-determination. Genuine self-determination requires a reconciliation of what Hegel calls objective and subjective spirit. Subjective spirit represents the individual will, which is free to a
lesser or greater extent in proportion to its self-awareness of its own principles. Objective spirit represents the expressions and actualizations of human spirit in social and political institutions. Hegel regards the task of a culture, a people, to be the achievement or actualization of freedom, the reconciliation of subjective and objective spirit such that the institutions of public life express the people’s freedom, and, conversely, the individuals are able to develop themselves freely in those institutions. According to Hegel, the Germanic tribes were unique in that they did not passively accept a conception of agency and morality on the basis of religious teachings or inherited customs, but they produced their agency, became self-determining, and were able to actualize subjective spirit in a way not before achieved. He writes in his _Philosophy of History_ that the principle of Spiritual Freedom – of Reconciliation [of the Objective and Subjective], was introduced into the still simple, unformed minds of those peoples [Germanic tribes]; and the part assigned them in the service of the World-Spirit was that of not merely possessing the Idea of Freedom as the substratum of their religious conceptions, but of producing it in free and spontaneous developments from their subjective self-consciousness (Hegel 1956, 341).

The achievement of the German tribes was particularly remarkable given that the German Nation was characterized by, what one may call, _Heart_ [Gemüt] (351), and

_Hart_ as purely abstract, is dullness; thus we see in the original condition of the Germans a barbarian dullness, mental confusion and vagueness … for substantial aims are not involved in _Heart_ itself. Where this susceptibility stands alone, it appears as a want of character – mere inanity (Hegel 1956, 352).

Hegel explains the uniqueness of the German case in distinction from the Greek and Roman cultures precisely through this dullness or ‘want of character’ that allowed a plasticity: their unformedness allowed the German tribes to consciously shape, rather than passively accept, a set of customs, a well-formed ethical life, or a second nature. According to Hegel, the Greeks and Romans reached maturity before they directed their interest outwards and became interested in conquests. They conquered and expanded their realm and influence, expressing and imposing the already achieved principles of their culture – they were not interested in learning from the peoples they conquered. However, according to Hegel, the Germans ‘began with self-diffusion’ before they reached cultural maturity. They first conquered ‘overpowering in their course the inwardly rotten, hollow political fabrics of the civilized nations. Only then did their development begin, kindled by a foreign culture, a foreign religion, polity and legislation’ (Hegel 1956, 359). The distinction between the Greeks and Romans, on the one hand, and the Germans, on the other, is that the latter ‘lacked’ a developed culture, one so mature that it would become ossified, and hollow, and thus resistant to change and vulnerable to destruction. The Germans first came to an understanding, so to say, of who they were, through their encounter of alien cultures inhabiting the lands they conquered. In Hegel’s own words, the German’s training through this process of culture consisted in taking up foreign elements and reductively amalgamating them with their own national life. Thus their history presents an introversion – the attraction of alien forms of life and the bringing these to bear upon their own [Sie haben sich durch das Aufnehmen und Überwinden des Fremden in sich gebildet, und ihre Geschichte ist vielmehr ein Insichgehen und Beziehen auf sich selbst] (Hegel 1956, 359).
Hegel’s account here depicts an encounter with an other that functions not only as the force of change and development but also as the necessary condition of a self-determined identity and inner unity. It is only through interaction (however non-reciprocal) with the other that the German spirit came to be what it is.

Apart from this somewhat out of character description of the debt of German development to the encounter with the other, Hegel almost speaks as the father of multiculturalism as he points out the necessity of such encounter for the education [Bildung] and thus development of any nation as well as world spirit, or humanity as such. He writes

if the nation has a basis [Voraussetzung] – such as the Greek world has in the Oriental – a foreign culture enters as an element into its primary condition, and it has a double culture, one original, the other of foreign suggestion. The uniting of these two elements constitutes its training [Bildung] (Hegel 1956, 224).

Hegel’s narrative of German development exemplifies the necessity of the mediation of a foreign other in a culture’s dynamic of self-determination. This dynamic has distinct steps: (1) The immersion in one’s second nature, into the ethical life one is born into, is a beginning point, one that is apparently without conflict, one that is taken to be the natural state of spirit, as a second nature. (2) Particularization and differentiation comprise the training of spirit through otherness, through a suspension of the immediate unity of the cultural and ethical life of one’s community. (3) The final step of reconciliation, the positing of a higher and more comprehensive unity, is the goal, but a goal that constitutes a starting point as soon as it is normalized and becomes institutionalized in culture, tradition, and ethical life. Without further activity, there is no self-determination, and activity requires constant particularization and differentiation. This dynamic applies at multiple registers of identity: Thus, if we, as individuals, communities, or humanity, are not trying actively to find new differentiations and new unities, we are effectively killing that which makes us human, (or what Hegel calls Spirit) since humanity is defined by self-determination. Hegel, in his account of the development of the German nation, signals the need for the encounter with an other. This other is not just any other, but one that brings forth habits from a different ethical life, perhaps a different set of priorities about human engagement and different religious, aesthetic, and philosophical expressions of humanity’s self-understanding. It is this encounter which brings to consciousness the contingency and thus non-essential status of one’s cultural heritage. The encounter with another version of second nature, a different linguistic tradition and/or cultural heritage, suspends the essential and natural relation one assumes to have in one’s possession with one’s own. Such encounters denaturalize one’s own associations and thus make them into objects of reflection and choice. And, as Hegel said above, such objectification and evaluation of the institutions of a given culture is the task of education and necessary condition of the dynamic of self-determination of humanity.

It must be noted that this requirement of the encounter with a foreign other for one’s self-determination also applies to migrant communities. However, there is a significant difference: As migrants venture beyond their comfort zones and move to foreign countries, they implicitly accept both the challenge and the lesson of being educated by the other. It may indeed be the case that some migrant communities become more conservative than the populations of their home countries, but this is usually a defensive posture. How not to have this encounter devolve into a domino of defensive aggression is
a good question for further analysis and exploration, but beyond the scope of this paper. My aim is to make the point that the migrants’ education in and of their host communities is valuable insofar as their very incorporation into the public life of host communities (1) allows people to notice their values as adopted and subject to willful consideration and (2) encourages them to reflect and more consciously choose the principles of their ethical life.

**Excursus: individuality, democracy, and education**

It is through a shared public life that individuals genuinely encounter possibilities of being that allows them to objectify their own conceptions of normality for reflective consideration. The form of this encounter should not be overdetermined as assimilation, nor should the encounter be reduced to ‘experiments of living’ since both approaches fail to make individuals critically aware of the strong hold their second natures have on their beliefs and values. In the following I consider two arguments, offered by Mill and Dewey respectively, that may be conflated with the one I develop based on Hegel’s concept of self-determination. I argue that neither practicing individualized eccentricity nor assimilating to neutral tolerance work for the type of self-awareness that genuine encounter with otherness encourages.

John Stuart Mill, another 19th century thinker, echoes Hegel’s requirement that the critique of tradition is a necessary condition for freedom and progress. He argues that blind acquiescence to tradition and culture brings stagnation:

> The despotism of custom is everywhere the standing hindrance to human advancement, being in unceasing antagonism to that disposition to aim at something better than customary, which is called, according to circumstances, the spirit of liberty, or that of progress or improvement (Mill 1978, 67).

Though my argument is closely related to and relies on arguments for the need for diversity in democracy, I believe that it is distinct in some key respects. When Mill argues for the necessity not only of diverse opinions but also of ‘different experiments of living’ for the development of mankind, he has a highly-individualized experiment in mind. He argues that ‘free scope should be given to varieties of character, short of injury to others; and that the worth of different modes of life should be proved practically, when anyone thinks fit to try them. It is desirable, in short, that in things which do not primarily concern others individuality should assert itself’ (Mill 1978, 54). Mill presents these individualized and different lives as choices, or, as experiments in living, which people, if they think it is right or desirable, should be free to try out. First, Mill’s stipulation that individuality should be given free rein ‘in things which do not primarily concern others’ seems to imply that these experiments of living will be strictly private in scope and influence. Thus, these experiments, by themselves, would not be good candidates for the kind of objectification and critical reflection of second nature that is necessary for free self-development. Second, however marginal they may be, Mill does not question the likelihood that these experiments of living share the cultural unity of their community, what I called a second nature in the sections above. His only mention of the need for foreign input or intervention is, unfortunately, the case of the Chinese, who ‘have discovered the secret of human progressiveness, … [but] have become stationary – have remained so for thousands of years … and if they are ever to be further improved it must be by foreigners’ (Mill 1978, 68).
While Mill is indeed concerned about the normalization and thus becoming unconscious of the mores of a community, he does not look for an antidote in the encounter with foreign traditions and cultures – except in a case of colonial intervention.

Towards the end of his argument for the necessity of cultivation of individuality and plurality of life experiments, Mill refers to Wilhelm von Humboldt’s assessment of the two necessary conditions of human development: ‘[f]reedom and a variety of situations’ (Mill 1978, 70). Mill laments that the latter is disappearing in England.

Formerly, different ranks, different neighborhoods, different trades and professions lived in what might be called different worlds … comparatively speaking, they now read the same things, listen to the same things, see the same things, go to the same places, have their hopes and fears directed to the same objects … and assimilation is still proceeding (70).

Thus, perhaps Mill himself would today, in the time when such assimilation is increasingly globalized, see the necessity of actively seeking the inclusion of people of foreign descent, who actually speak different languages, read different books, or view different media. His warning that ‘mankind speedily becom[ing] unable to conceive diversity when they have been unaccustomed to see it’ (71) could best be remedied by the inclusion of immigrants in communities.

The question Dewey addresses represents the side of unity rather than individuality, as he asks how to practice this inclusion: How open can the host culture be to the foreign others before it loses its identity? How should the clash between the rights of immigrants to practice and follow their culture and the right to self-determination of the host culture be negotiated? And, even Dewey, a venerable defender of the significance of education for democratic institutions, shows the tendency to emphasize the aspect of assimilation, when it comes to ‘foreign traditions.’ In Democracy in Education, only a few passages address alien cultures or peoples, but when Dewey addresses the question of foreign cultures and traditions, it is with the purpose of emphasizing the need for assimilation. He notes that the United States, as a country housing diverse traditions and customs, needs a means of building community, a way of forming a national identity that unites people of various heritage. And, such a task is best accomplished through an educational program that functions as an ‘assimilative force’:

In the olden times, the diversity of groups was largely a geographical matter. There were many societies, but each, within its own territory, was comparatively homogeneous. But with the development of commerce, transportation, intercommunication, and emigration, countries like the United States are composed of a combination of different groups with different traditional customs. It is this situation which has, perhaps more than any other one cause, forced the demand for an educational institution which shall provide something like a homogeneous and balanced environment for the young. Only in this way can the centrifugal forces set up by juxtaposition of different groups within one and the same political unit be counteracted. The intermingling in the school of youth of different races, differing religions, and unlike customs creates for all a new and broader environment. Common subject matter accustoms all to a unity of outlook upon a broader horizon than is visible to the members of any group while it is isolated. The assimilative force of the American public school is eloquent testimony to the efficacy of the common and balanced appeal.

Dewey walks a fine line here, both praising the ‘broader environment’ that is the result of the co-existence of the diverse races, religions, and customs and also cautioning that it is necessary to counteract the ‘centrifugal forces’ set up by the wayward pulls of these
diverse traditions. The assimilative force of public education, Dewey believes, allows for a unity of perspective that assures a level of homogeneity and common purpose. While choosing not to problematize the ‘enculturation’ sense of education, Dewey’s account is silent on the task of self-overcoming, and leaves unaddressed the ‘perfectibility’ element of education, which ensures self-awareness, critical reflection, and thus, free self-development. Integration and/or assimilation is the erasure of exactly the type of difference that I argue is central to both the advancement of culture and development of individual freedom. It is through the encounter of unshared assumptions of everyday existence that individuals come to become aware of, reflect on, and evaluate the ones they take as givens. Such reflection opens up a space for a renewed consideration of the validity of one’s culture and traditions, or, in Hegel’s words, one’s ethical life [Sittlichkeit]. In the next section, I distinguish my account of an encounter with a foreign other as part of the daily life of individuals who live with migrants from Fraenkel’s praise of a clash of cultures. Fraenkel posits such a ‘clash of cultures’ as a necessary element in the self-correcting path of development of both communal and universal values and beliefs, and characterizes such cultural exchange specifically as an intellectual debate. However, the migrants’ education I speak of is none of these things: it is neither an experimentation of individual values (as with Mill), nor a cultivation of unity (as with Dewey). It is also emphatically not a theoretical conversation or intellectual debate that explicitly addresses sources of difference and possible conflict. Migrants’ education is rather an attitude of self-overcoming for all involved parties.

Not clash but encounter: intellectual empathy as a necessary condition of freedom

I first encountered the term, ‘clash of cultures,’ used in an affirmative sense, in Carlos Fraenkel’s ‘In Praise of the Clash of Cultures’ which first appeared in The New York Times’ ‘Opinionator’ series. Through anecdotes of his personal encounters with different cultures in his travels as a student and scholar, Fraenkel argues in favor of cultivating and defending a culture of debate. While it may sound like my argument calls for a clash of cultures (of sorts), I find the term needlessly predetermines the encounter as a hostile one and erases the self-reflective element that is key to my analysis. I agree with Fraenkel that a culture of debate contributes to and furthers a robust philosophical perspective: By sharing diverse perspectives, humanity progresses in its understanding both of the world and of itself, and thus is likely to find better solutions to common problems and make progress in learning to live together. However, my argument emphasizes the encounter between cultural horizons and lifeworlds within and through daily life and thus I find it important to distinguish Fraenkel’s idea of a culture of debate from my appeal to migrants as educators of culture. Fraenkel’s article is especially relevant for my argument since he also addresses the bonds of tradition and second nature and points out the need for diverse perspectives to overcome the blindness of tradition. Fraenkel introduces these points through his discussion of the seminal medieval Muslim philosopher al-Ghazâlî. Al-Ghazâlî’s description of the ‘bonds of taqlîd,’ that is, ‘the beliefs and values stemming from the contingent circumstances of our socialization’ sound very much like the description of second nature. In Fraenkel’s account, these bonds break as al-
Ghazâlî ‘realized that he would have been just as fervent a Jew or Christian as he was a Muslim, had he been brought up in a Jewish or Christian community’ (Fraenkel 2016, 435). Fraenkel points out, as I have done above, that this acknowledgement of the contingency of one’s upbringing is sufficient, as shown by the example of al-Ghazâlî, for opening up a space for intellectual empathy and genuine evaluation of one’s commitments.

Fraenkel’s intention with the phrase ‘clash of cultures’ is an open debate between respectful and equal partners in dialogue made possible by such intellectual empathy. He cites the record of a theological debate from medieval Islam, described by the historian al-Humaydi (d. 1095), that could very well serve as a prototype of cosmopolitan multicultural liberal discourse for our present day:

At the … meeting there were present not only people of various [Islamic] sects but also unbelievers, Magians, materialists, atheists, Jews and Christians, in short unbelievers of all kinds. Each group had its own leader, whose task it was to defend its views … One of the unbelievers rose and said to the assembly: we are meeting here for a debate; its conditions are known to all. You, Muslims, are not allowed to argue from your books and prophetic traditions since we deny both. Everybody, therefore, has to limit himself to rational arguments [hujaj al-‘aql]. The whole assembly applauded these words (Fraenkel 2016, 436)

While I celebrate the sentiment and largely agree with the premises of Fraenkel’s essay, I worry that such intellectual debate requires conditions not accessible to many: being a scholar, being funded to travel the world, belonging to a class/gender/race that allows one to interact with the people in various parts of the world in a semi-equal footing, are all signs of rare privilege that some in the academy are uniquely positioned to enjoy. But what individuals and cultures need, in terms of educating themselves to the contingency of the circumstances of their upbringing, is the daily encounter with individuals and cultures that share lifeworlds and perspectives that vary in differing degrees from their own. And while I accept that mere co-existence of diverse cultures does not guarantee such self-reflection and self-overcoming, and that on the contrary it may often result in xenophobic attitudes, and sometimes violence, I would also point out that such hostilities cannot be evaluated in isolation from colonial histories, economic inequalities, unjust government policies, etc., and do not by themselves suffice to undermine the possibility and value of defending migrant-friendly policies and institutions.

Situating intellectual empathy as a necessary condition of free self-determination allows for a sort of encounter of cultures that tempers the discourse of a ‘clash of cultures.’ The virtue of intellectual empathy relies on the capacity to objectify and de-naturalize one’s native perspective such that one can suspend one’s automatic valuations and responses and understand the world and others from an unfamiliar perspective. I have been arguing that such empathy is not merely an exercise in altruism or charity, but one that is necessary for true exercise of freedom, or genuine self-development. In an article exploring the Enlightenment conception of philosophy, Allen Wood presents an analysis of self-determination that argues that individual freedom, perhaps paradoxically, requires sociability and respect for others. According to Wood, freedom requires that one:

understands the causes which move her and knows the true origin of the principles she follows. This knowledge liberates her because it enables her to estimate the true worth of her motives and her maxims, and thus to be moved only by causes that can withstand rational reflection (Wood 2001, 109).
Wood is suggesting that an individual can act freely only if she is aware of the causes of her actions – that knowing the causes allows her a say over which causes she will affirm and want to have continue determining her actions and behavior, and which she will want to alter, modify, or eliminate altogether. Such an evaluation of the causes and principles of one’s opinions and actions (as well as a community’s beliefs and values) requires critical rational reflection, and, according to Wood, such critical reflection ‘is grounded on an understanding of principles opposed to one’s own, and of the arguments that may be offered in favor of such foreign principles,’ and to acquire such understanding, one ‘must attend to the opinions of others and understand the grounds for them just as well as she does her own opinions and the arguments for them’ (Wood 2001, 110).

Building on such an understanding of self-determination, I posit that it is both more appropriate and more productive to characterize the encounter with the foreign other as not constituting a clash but rather an awakening from the slumber of one’s second nature. One’s principles, commitments, and estimations of entitlements are acquired through one’s education, both cultural and formal, and for these very habits of daily and intellectual life to become objects of critical reflection, they need to be brought down from the pedestal of being natural, normal, or by default right. It is precisely through encounter with other, especially foreign, cultural and linguistic practices – or life-worlds – with the attitude and method of intellectual empathy that an individual will be able to acknowledge the contingency and partiality of his or her inherited lifeworld. And such realization will make possible a conscious choice of either continued commitment to or modification of one’s principles and values, giving individuals a firmer grasp on who they are and a better shot at genuine self-determination.

Living with, going to school with, attending town halls with, sharing public spaces with immigrants make individuals of the host community aware of their default state, their cultural education. The differences function as a mirror for individuals, enabling them to view the unspoken assumptions of their upbringing as objects of reflection. What is taken for granted as normal becomes one possible way of being. Even if it may instigate defensive responses, living together with foreigners makes communities aware of their second nature; it urges individuals to accept that it is a second nature. Such self-awareness functions in the way of a clearing of the ground would: individuals come to accept that what they take as their identity is not this ‘natural’ or ‘essential’ way of being but one that has been available for them, one that has been practiced around them, one they have learned. This denaturalizes their social and ethical commitments, weakens the default power of some of their cultural attitudes, beliefs, and values, and thus creates the possibility of reflecting on, revising, and finally adopting one’s worldview in a more self-reflective manner. The direct result of this may be hostility and resistance for some, at least initially. However, for those who can overcome the defensive posture of hostility and rejection, this encounter makes self-reflection possible, and thus opens up a space for freedom. The freedom at stake is not one of license, of being able to do as one wills, but one of self-conscious self-determination where one reflectively chooses the principles of one’s will. The givenness of a finished or fixed identity must be suspended for the possibility of such freedom, of the type of agency that is not coded or pre-programmed. Only when individuals become aware of the hidden causes of their beliefs and values are they in a position to evaluate and consciously choose them. And the best and perhaps only way of becoming aware of the hidden causes and principles of one’s beliefs, values, and thus actions – what
is often dubbed ‘one’s way of life’ – is through having them exposed as objects of reflection and evaluation. This objectification can be brought forth theoretically, through reading, learning languages, perhaps through traveling and immersing oneself in alternate lifeworlds, but it can come also through sharing one’s lifeworld with migrant individuals. Immigrants expose and challenge what people take to be their ‘way of life’ by showing that it is not the only possible way, or that it is not the best one, either.  

Though my argument risks treating immigrants as mere means to the host culture’s self-development, I hope it avoids treating them merely as means as long as it treats them as partners in an ongoing conversation about humanity’s commitments and entitlements, and as agents in daily encounters that make up the public life of a community. Such treatment absolves the immigrants from the dilemma of either fitting in (and, thus losing their original culture) or staying true to a version of their original culture (and, thus living with the stigma of not fitting in). The migrant communities, freed from the double bind of belonging only through not belonging, would be more likely to objectify and face their own second nature and more reflectively, and thus freely, choose what to keep and what to leave behind. By showing the necessity of the foreign, the alien, which is best represented in the person of the migrant for free self-development, my argument adds a strategic defense for the case of more open immigration policies and integration of migrants in the social and educational institutions of host countries.

Services that uniquely target immigrants, and thus separate and segregate them from the host community, add to the stigma of being alien. Intellectual exchanges that allow for a clash of cultures or civilizations set up ‘sides’ based on stereotypical identities, and people enter those conversations with a defensive posture and never reach what Brecht called for in his description of the Verfremdungseffekt, which I referenced in the beginning of my essay: a stepping outside of their frameworks. People, migrants and native-born citizens, living in communities together, should be encouraged by democratic procedures to be active participants in those communities – whether in educational institutions, public programs, or town hall events. My argument, in its consequences for the collective life of a community, calls for a local focus to political activity. It is the common concerns of communities that should guide their political voices and it is through conversations and encounters that arise in daily life about concerns common to us, as members of the communities we live in, that we can really learn from others and about ourselves. And, subsequently, make a future together.

Notes

1. Brecht (1964, 92). In his essay ‘Alienation Effects in Chinese Acting’ originally published in 1936, Brecht describes a Verfremdungseffekt—the effect of defamiliarization that results from seeing characters on stage that do not conform to audience expectations. This defamiliarization allows the audience to kick back their ingrained habits, implicit biases, subconscious, knee-jerk reactions, and consciously evaluate, ‘accept or reject,’ the actor’s choices. This example from art is a perfect case of the denaturalization and thus opening up to conscious reflection of one’s lifeworld as one encounters unfamiliar ways of being in the world.

2. In Immigration and Refugees, Dummett’s summary of the two main sources of immigration confirms this characterization of immigrants as people in need and host countries as providers: The oppression inflicted by many governments upon their peoples and the civil wars that rage in countries such as Sri Lanka account for many of the genuine refugees that flee
their homelands; but the poverty that afflicts much of the Third World prompts thousands who are scorned as “economic migrants” to seek a more bearable life in the prosperous West’ (Dummett 2001, 25).

3. To put in context the spirit of the times, it is appropriate to mention that the Immigration Authority, USCIS, of the current Trump administration, erased the phrase ‘nation of immigrants’ from its mission statement.

4. A helpful resource which identifies the different positions related to immigration policies and argues for open borders, is Joseph Carens (1987) article ‘Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders.’ Carens argues from diverse approaches in liberal political theory (visiting arguments from Rawls, Nozick, and utilitarian theory) for the conclusion that ‘our deep commitment to respect all human beings as free and equal moral persons’ (251) is the root of the case for open borders, despite their differences in many other respects. Then he takes on Walzer’s objection to his position. ‘Walzer’s central claim is that exclusion is justified by the right of communities to self-determination’ (266). I argue that self-determination is possible only through encounters with a different other – not merely a diverse other that I tolerate and let be (‘you stay there I stay here we each have our way’), but one that challenges some of my basic premises, so that I need to suspend my affiliations, if for a moment, to think about why I am the way I am and why I think the way I do. Intellectual empathy is only possible through shared public life, that is, through shared institutions of public life, such as educational institutions. I agree with Carens that ‘to commit ourselves to open borders would not be to abandon the idea of communal character but to reaffirm it’ (Carens 1987, 271).

5. As Dummett points out ‘the system of nation-states virtually guarantees universal national selfishness’ (Dummett 2001, 48).

6. I follow here the sense in which Hegel describes custom or habit as constituting a second nature. Hegel points out that ‘habit is rightly called a second nature; nature because it is an immediate being of the soul; a second nature, because it is an immediacy created by the soul, impressing and molding [eine Ein- und Durchbildung] the corporeality, which enters into the modes of feeling … representation and will in so far as they take on corporeal form’ (Hegel 1971, § 410 Remark). I develop the connection between Bildung and second nature in the second part of this essay.

7. This approach may appear to treat migrants instrumentally, but such self-interest is closer to truth and more ethical than reducing migrants to mere foreign work force, or to mere victims of their own cultures or states. I return to this point at the end of my paper.

8. On the one hand, Bildung provides a shared lifeworld that shapes individuals: ‘Bildung signifies the process of individual self-development that co-ordinates with the progression of culture as a manifestation of shared standpoint. If individuals are to arrive at a reflective identification with the norms and institutions of the social world of which they are a part, they must first understand themselves in their subjective particularity. [Its aim] … is to provide persons with an understanding of their subjective self that accepts the social aims and customs that shape coordinated human activity. Such an individualized and at the same time shared standpoint is achieved through Bildung’ (Dum and Guay 2017, 299). On the other hand, it is the dynamic of change, transformation, and progress as it relates to the perfectibility of the human race (Hegel 1991a, §343 Remark). Hegel’s use of the term Bildung is thus productively ambiguous and allows his readers to observe the paradoxical nature of education.

9. My use of the term ‘lifeworld’ follows Habermas’s definition of it as an ‘intersubjectively shared’ or ‘collective’ life-context comprising the totality of interpretations which are presupposed as background knowledge by members of society. The lifeworld is said to be a culturally transmitted and linguistically organized reservoir of implicit knowledge, that is, a collection of dispersed, unproblematic background convictions providing a source of situation definitions. Habermas, by ‘lifeworld,’ does not only mean cultural meaning patterns or interpretative schemes, as it is, he claims, done in phenomenology, but he means ‘individual skills as well – the intuitive knowledge of how one deals with situations – and socially customary practices too – the intuitive knowledge of what one can count on in situations’ (Habermas 1981, 135).
10. I agree with Allen Wood that upbringing [Erziehung] and schooling [Bildung] largely overlap both in terms of their aim and the mechanics of their practice. Speaking of Bildung as a fundamental theme in Hegel's philosophy, Wood notes that this term 'might be translated as “education,” but it could also be rendered, more appropriately in many contexts, as “formation,” “development” or “culture.” For Hegel, the term refers to the formative self-development of mind or spirit (Geist), regarded as a social and historical process ... Bildung is to be distinguished from the “upbringing” (Erziehung) of a child by its parents or pedagogues. But for Hegel the essential end of both processes is the same. For the principal achievement of upbringing is to overcome immediacy, simplicity or natural crudity (Rohheit), to deepen spirit through thought, of the universal’ (Wood 1998, 301).

11. See alternate translation, offered by Ahlers, that makes Hegel's meaning clearer in English: 'The “work” of a culture must be to “have itself as its own object.” A people is historical only “in thinking itself”’ (Ahlers 1984, 154).

12. This is also a reference in support of the position that we should not read Hegel as merely arguing that history is the ultimate adjudicator of all moral conflict ... there is a self-conscious element that needs to be taken into account in humanity’s making of itself.

13. Doppelsatz refers to Hegel’s claim, repeated both in the Preface to the Philosophy of Right and in the opening paragraphs of his Encyclopedia, that ‘what is rational is actual, and what is actual is rational.’ This claim is interpreted by many to imply that, for Hegel, whatever is, just by virtue of being in existence, is justified. Hegel also considers the state to be ‘the actuality of concrete freedom’ (Hegel 1991a, §260) and argues that the state is ‘that form of reality in which the individual has and enjoys his freedom; but on the condition of his recognizing, believing in, and willing that which is common to the Whole’ (Hegel 1956, 53). Hegel’s understanding of the state as the actualization of freedom coupled with the Doppelsatz has represented, for interpreters, Hegel’s unquestioning endorsement of the Prussian state of his time. For an in-depth discussion of this claim and the controversy it has originated, see Stern (2006). I disagree with this quietist interpretation since Hegel’s analysis of self-determination points to an activity that is self-relating and ongoing, and as such open-ended.

14. Most recently, Allison Stone (2017) has given a comprehensive analysis of both Hegel’s arguments in defense of European colonialism and arguments from the critics who accuse Hegel of Eurocentricism.

15. Hegel points out in his Encyclopedia Part I: Logic that freedom means ‘being at home with oneself in one’s other’ (Hegel 1991b, § 24 Addition 2). This implies that mediation through difference and otherness is essential for identity formation and self-determination, and that such difference should be incorporated and accounted for rather than merely negated or suppressed.

16. Note that, although Hegel here is talking about conquests, his discussion of cultural development still holds as the German culture is said to become what it is through encounter of, identification with, and differentiation from these foreign cultures.

17. I must acknowledge here that cultures are rarely homogeneous and that linguistic and cultural unity is an abstraction and generalization; however, the lack of homogeneity does not signal necessarily the absence of a shared lifeworld, a common denominator, that is left unquestioned, constituting the silent and apparently indifferent ground of all differentiation. It is this comfortable zone of assumptions and habits that needs to become an object of reflective attention and denaturalization for genuine self-determination to be possible.

18. ‘Hegel’s views … have something in common with J. S. Mill’s insistence that ‘individuality’ is one of the elements of human well-being. Unlike Mill, however, Hegel is concerned to identify the diversity of social types with the articulation of determinate socioeconomic roles, positions, or estates, which constitute the ethical order of civil society (PR § 202). Hegel stresses the diversity and complementarity of the estates, each with its own ethical ‘disposition’ or ‘outlook’ and way of life … his conception of the value of individuality is less radical than Mill’s, less experimental in spirit, and less open-ended in intent. This difference also reveals how Mill’s notion of individuality owes more to the Romantic tradition than Hegel’s does.

19. Mill’s exact description is as follows: ‘As it is useful that while mankind are imperfect there should be different opinions, so is it that there should be different experiments of living’ (Mill 1978, 54).

20. See footnote 4 above.

21. Habermas states this question succinctly thus: ‘Assuming that the autonomously developed state order is indeed shaped by ethics, does the right to self-determination not include the right of a nation to affirm its identity vis-à-vis immigrants who could give a different cast to this historically developed political-cultural form of life?’ (Habermas 1994, 137)

22. If one views migrant cultures as threats to the native culture, then it follows that the assimilation of immigrants will be treated as a necessary condition for the continued integrity of the native culture. Dummett points out that this anxiety is without merit: ‘In normal circumstances, that is, in countries which are neither part of a colonial empire nor under the rule of oppressive invaders, there is no danger whatever that even a relatively high level of immigration will threaten the native culture or population with being submerged. A vigorous culture will assimilate new features, to its own benefit, or ignore them if they cannot fruitfully be assimilated’ (Dummett 2001, 20).

23. Dewey (1916, 21). I quote this passage at length because it presents an excellent summary of a narrative of nation building that is influential for the American self-image.

24. Fraenkel notes that al-Ghazâlî ‘explains taqlîd as the authority of parents and teachers,’ which we can restate more generally as all things other than rational argument that influence what we think and do: from media, fashion and marketing to political rhetoric and religious ideology’ (Fraenkel 2016, 435).

25. One would rightly point out that the immigrants also need self-overcoming; however, the migrant, by traveling, and leaving her home culture, has already suspended the absolute immersion that is the rule of culture as second nature.

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