“WE CLOSED DOWN THE DAMN SCHOOL”: THE PARTY CULTURE AND STUDENT PROTEST AT SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY DURING THE VIETNAM WAR ERA

by Robbie Lieberman and David Cochran

In May 1970, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale (SIUC), was one of hundreds of college campuses that shut down for the rest of the term in the wake of violence that followed the killing of four students by the National Guard at Kent State University. This article analyzes the makeup of the student movement at SIUC, arguing that it was composed of three strains: student rights, New Left, and what we call the “party culture.” Local issues such as the hours women had to be in their dormitories at night brought such groups together in an attempt to gain control over their own lives. The movement did not turn its full attention to the Vietnam War until it had a local symbol of university complicity with the war, the controversial Vietnamese Studies Center. In detailing the events at SIUC, we challenge the standard narrative of the sixties that treats the later part of the decade as a period of “decline.” We argue that the movement was still going strong, not only in spite of but because of the turn to a more expressive politics.

On May 6, 1970, three thousand people gathered in front of Morris Library on the campus of Southern Illinois University (SIU) at Carbondale to protest the U.S. invasion of Cambodia and the killing of four students at Kent State University. Dwight Campbell, the popular and charismatic president of student government, was one of the speakers at the rally. An African American and head of the interracial, leftist Unity Party, Campbell drew a comparison between Kent State and SIU. “We need to understand,” he said, “that what happened at Kent State is something we should’ve expected a long time ago.” Referring to a January confrontation between students and campus security forces outside the Vietnam Studies Center, Campbell said, “The only difference between what happened here at Woody Hall and what happened at Kent State is a matter of degree.” In conclusion, Campbell urged people to honor the dead by continuing the movement against the war. “Them cats
don’t want flowers. They want you to carry on the struggle where they left off. Don’t just have a memorial service—have a struggle service.”

In echoing the Wobbly martyr Joe Hill’s last words, “Don’t mourn, organize,” Campbell’s speech placed events at SIU in the context of the long-term history of the American left, the national mass movement against the war in Vietnam, and the escalating tensions between students and administrators on the SIU campus over local issues. Local issues—the ones that clearly touched on their lives, their campus, and their right to express themselves and have a good time—galvanized many students to join the movements of the 1960s. Nevertheless, our understanding of the student movement tends to be framed by events that gained national media attention, such as the free speech movement in Berkeley and the Columbia University strike. But the movement did not exist only on the coasts and at elite schools; it was also a collection of local movements, many of these in the South and Midwest, made up of long-forgotten leaders and events that never captured national headlines. At this level, the movement mixed national and local issues. It also unfolded extremely unevenly; battles fought out in one place were not necessarily won everywhere.

For instance, in late February 1970 more than 1,000 SIU students engaged in a campaign of civil disobedience, and the Dean of Students responded by suspending six student government leaders, including president Dwight Campbell and vice-president Richard Wallace. Student leaders reacted with a call to boycott classes, while Campbell proclaimed, “Students are niggers and it’s time to break the chains.”

At first glance these events appear typical of the student movement of the late sixties and early seventies in terms of tactics and rhetoric. But a closer look reveals a more complicated picture. In the first place, here is a militant black leader protesting being treated as a “nigger” not as an African American, but as a student. Second, the issue that provoked such upheaval was the university’s in loco parentis policies—specifically, the hours when men and women could study together in women’s dormitories.

Finally, the strategy of mass nonviolent civil disobedience over the issue of dorm hours stands out when viewed in the context of local, not just national, events over the previous two years. Numerous bomb threats and several bombings took place at SIU in 1968, and in 1969 the Old Main Building—the campus’s most recognizable landmark—was burned to the ground. During the first two months of 1970, campus and city police used force to put down a series of student antiwar demonstrations. Terming these events a “police riot,” Campbell said, “There is a crisis on this campus and this is just the beginning. Going up against a club with a flower will never
work." It therefore seems surprising that a few weeks after defending the occupation of buildings and the use of self-defense in antiwar activities, Campbell would be engaged in leading something so seemingly anachronistic as an integrated, nonviolent protest over dorm hours.

The contradictions that marked the student movement in Carbondale largely grow out of the fact that the movement was composed of three separate strains that gradually came together in the late sixties. One strain grew out of the student rights movement that began in the mid-sixties, drawing together students from across the political spectrum. A second strain, numerically the smallest, was the New Left, which had been a presence on campus since the civil rights movement of the early sixties through such organizations as the Student Nonviolent Freedom Committee and Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). The third strain, which seemed to leave the deepest mark on the student movement, is what we call the “party culture,” which developed with the rapid growth of the university. These strains alternately converged and separated until, by the spring of 1970, a combination of local and national events brought them together in a series of mass demonstrations. When campus, city, and state authorities responded with a show of force, the result was a riot that led to 79 arrests, 59 injuries, $100,000 damage to 78 businesses, and the closing of the university.

It is our contention that local histories do far more than fill in pieces of the national story of 1960s protest. Accounts of the movement on a local level, in particular at midwestern and southern state universities in the later part of the decade and into the 1970s, alter that larger story and challenge the standard narrative in significant ways. Standard works on the period suggest that early 1960s activism was “good,” resting on moral commitment, nonviolence, and community, while the later period was one of decline, mainly due to the emergence and impact of the self-indulgent counterculture. Scholars are just beginning to turn away from the “good/bad” sixties typology to a more subtle and sophisticated reading of the late 1960s and early 1970s that includes the activism at large state universities around the country. Doug Rossinow, in particular, challenges the “declension thesis”—the argument that the late sixties was simply a period of decline for protest movements. The style of protest may have changed, but it was still going strong on the national level, as witnessed by the large antiwar moratoriums of 1969 and 1970, and the emergence of the women’s, gay rights, and environmental movements. Some local movements, in which a party culture element had long been a significant influence, were in fact just coming into their own. Clearly a rethinking of the late sixties is in order.
SIU was transformed from a small teachers’ college into a major multiversity between the end of World War II and 1970 largely through the efforts of one man, President Delyte Morris. A visionary, Morris undertook a massive building campaign to accompany the expansion of the university’s mission. Enrollment increased rapidly, from 9,000 in 1960 to nearly 24,000 by 1970.\(^9\)

As SIU alumnus Dick Gregory recalls, Morris “was not just the head of the university, he was the father. . . . Delyte Morris was the first white man I knew who had both power and compassion.”\(^{10}\) He was in most respects a staunch liberal. From the beginning he strongly supported civil rights and sought to increase black enrollment at SIU. He was also deeply committed to using the university to combat the region’s poverty, and he worked to keep costs and admission standards low enough to ensure access for the local population. At other times Morris’s respect for liberal principles caused him to place the university’s prestige behind the protection of students’ free speech rights, even in the face of strong criticism within the region. In 1962, for instance, he defended the right of SIU students to participate in the civil rights movement in nearby Cairo; in 1965 he allowed the campus SDS to bring Herbert Aptheker, who was a Communist, to speak on campus. At the same time, as Gregory’s comments imply, Morris was a paternalistic ruler who would brook no challenges to his authority. In a sense he sought to run the multiversity he created as if it were still a small teachers’ college in which he knew the students and they deferred to his benevolent leadership.\(^{11}\)

Morris’s leadership style grew increasingly untenable through the sixties. SIU students faced the problem then, as they still do, of being part of a large university in a small, isolated town with limited sources of entertainment. Thus, with the rapid increase in the student population in the sixties, SIU developed a reputation as a “party school,” which often placed students in opposition to university and city administrators. The first major confrontation in this regard occurred during finals week in June 1966, in what entered local lore as the “Moo and Cackle riots.” (Much of the action took place in the parking lot of Carbondale’s first fast-food restaurant, the Moo and Cackle.)

The events began when police broke up a late-night water fight. The next night a large crowd of male students engaged in a panty raid at two women’s dorms. Again police broke up the festivities, this time, as students complained, using excessive force. The following night students returned, spreading into downtown Carbondale. State police dressed in riot gear joined local and campus forces. They fired tear gas into the crowd as students built a bonfire in the street, threw rocks at police cars, and chanted “cops eat shit.”
When thirteen students were arrested, the crowd marched to the police station and staged a sit-in on Main Street. The next night police arrested twenty-three more rioters. President Morris expelled all students who had been arrested, the first mass expulsion in SIU’s history.12

The Moo and Cackle riot is merely the first of Carbondale’s impromptu street demonstrations that frequently turned into clashes with the police.13 Seen in context, however, this particular event is characteristic of the development of SIU’s student movement in several ways. The origins of the event were completely apolitical, but overreaction by the police created resentment on the part of students, and that then became the issue. Once the demonstrations gained a focus, students began imitating tactics from the civil rights movement, staging a mass sit-in. Despite such tactics, the overall atmosphere was not exactly nonviolent; students seemed to enjoy engaging the police in violent confrontations.

Even as the party culture developed at SIU, it underwent a major transformation as it increasingly came to be dominated by the counterculture of the late sixties. As Larry Vaughn, who entered SIU as a freshman in 1968, remembers:

> When I first got here . . . I hung out with beer-drinking, fast-car-driving kids in the dorms. Over Christmas I went home for the holidays and a friend of mine had gone to Stanford University and he brought some pot home. . . . Instead of drinking we started smoking pot and by the time the holidays were over it was like my whole perspective on how to have a good time had changed. So I came back to the dorms and I started hanging out with an entirely different crowd of people.14

Drug use apparently was widespread in Carbondale, but this did not militate against student activism. One Southern Illinois native who returned to SIU in 1968 after two years in the Peace Corps found that “There were a lot of drugs and that made a difference. Somehow or other that created an involvement rather than a drop out [mentality].” Similarly, others remember that by 1968 many students were smoking pot and dropping acid, but “they weren’t necessarily dropping out.”15

Using drugs was only one part of exploring alternative ideas and lifestyles, and that exploration, more generally, helped create a strong sense of community. “The culture and the talk was the same whether you were at Hutchins Creek Farm [a commune] or at my house or out at a bar,” says Jim Hanson, who was a graduate student at SIU in the late sixties. “[The] same subjects were being talked about—the war, the oppressive government, the
need for an alternative lifestyle, the need, the great need for change, especially
to democratize SIU.” The sense of community was further enhanced by peo-
ple getting together to listen to music, either in homes or at concerts.16

Throughout the sixties there were overlaps between party culture and
student rights concerns, as well as individuals who straddled both groups or
who gravitated from one to another. Larry Bennett, who came to SIU in
1965 looking for a “fun scene” and who participated in the Moo and Cackle
riots, became, in his own words, “a student power person.”17 Ray Lenzi went
from straight fraternity boy promoting student rights in the student govern-
ment to an antiwar activist who grew his hair long, experimented with drugs,
and moved to a commune, returning to SIU for the events of spring 1970.18

The student rights movement established itself as a presence on campus
in the spring of 1965 with the founding of the Rational Action Movement
(RAM). RAM drew the support of a broad cross-section of students; its
twenty-member coordinating committee included members of SDS as well
as representatives from the Young Republicans and Young Americans for
Freedom. In late April and early May, RAM gathered 2,500 signatures and
held a mass rally focusing on such issues as student control of the Student
Center, the administration’s decision to shorten spring break, and the censor-
ship of the editorial page of the student newspaper.19 Such agitation led to the
creation of the Action Party, which consistently fought for student rights for
the rest of the sixties. But on such issues, Morris increasingly dug in his heels,
refusing to abolish women’s dorm hours and, in 1967, banning KA, a stu-
dent-edited insert in the campus newspaper, after it published an anonymous
article encouraging students to violate dorm visitation rules.20

The final strain of the movement grew out of the Student Nonviolent
Freedom Committee (SNFC), which originated in 1962 as a local chapter
of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). The SNFC
took part in regional actions, most notably in Cairo, as well as picketing local
businesses that practiced discrimination. It is significant that such groups
remained isolated and autonomous rather than being led or restricted by ties
to the national organization. Jim Adams recalls that, “even though SNCC
was national . . . there was nothing about national coordination there [in
Carbondale]. . . . Nobody came through that I know of. We were doing our
own thing.”21

A small group of students active in the local civil rights movement, but
seeking to expand its scope, formed the Socialist Discussion Club in 1965.
The group increasingly focused on the war, setting up tables to hand out
literature next to military recruiters in the student center and organizing an
antiwar teach-in. Within a fairly short time, former member Mike Harty
says, “the membership of that old Socialist Discussion Club pretty much became SDS. . . . The irony was that from ’65 through ’68, SDS was in technical terms quite conservative. We were sort of serious, we weren’t interested in game playing, we weren’t interested in drugs.”22 The local SDS chapter was also totally autonomous of the national office, though not necessarily by choice. As Harty says, “We tried to have contact but nobody ever wrote back. Seriously.”23 As another former activist expresses it:

It seemed a very local affair. I didn’t see any coordinated national leadership. . . . As far as national SDS people coming in holding rap conferences with us—’Here’s what we’re doing here, what are you guys doing here? We’ll assist you, we’ll send you money, we’ll help you get out posters, we’ll do this, we’ll do that at Carbondale, we’ll help you if you’ll help us’—I never heard [of or] attended a meeting like that. It was all local insofar as I knew.24

In addition to SDS, there were other small, leftist political organizations on campus. One of the most important was the Southern Illinois Peace Committee (SIPC), founded in 1967 and led by Bill Moffett, a black Trotskyist and pacifist.25 It was Moffett who held the group to a philosophy of non-sectarianism and nonviolence. “We had a lot of debates about . . . ideology, did we stand for a certain ideology?” one member recalls. “Moffett always succeeded in telling us no, we’re an issue-related movement—that is, we’re going to stop the war—and any political statements or any acts of violence in the end would be counterproductive.”26

From the beginning, organizations such as SDS served as the left wing of the student rights movement. The left viewed in loco parentis issues as valuable for educating students as to the nature of their powerlessness. Even those students who were not political resented the administration’s paternalism, and SDS members believed such resentment was a starting point to “show people what the university was all about.” Mike Harty adds, “We also saw it as a way of forming alliances with people you wouldn’t necessarily go for an alliance with. People who you didn’t even know, student government, fraternity and sorority people.”27

Despite the efforts of SDS to pull the student rights movement to the left, RAM continued to represent a broad cross-section of the political spectrum for several years. During the 1967–68 school year, however, important changes took place as the three strains of the movement began to come together, especially under the leadership of the student government president, Ray Lenzi. A candidate of the Action Party, Lenzi was elected with his
running mate and fraternity brother, Richard Karr, on a straight student rights platform. But during the fall term, Lenzi hesitantly began to speak out against the war, a stance that created tension between him and Karr, who was a conservative, pro-war Young Republican.28

During the winter and spring quarters of 1968, Lenzi consciously tried to pull together student rights, antiwar, and counterculture concerns. As he points out, the politicization of many students grew out of their participation in the party culture. “Everybody was getting turned on. . . . They were smoking pot, they were dropping acid. . . . That increased their sense of negativity toward the government: ‘What do you mean, they put you in jail for doing this?’ That was just another reason to assume there was something evil about the authorities and the government system.”29 Lenzi introduced a bill in the student senate that spring titled “Legalization of Marijuana: Pot is Groovy” that stated, “marijuana is too popular to be denied the public” and called on SIU police to “take the most relaxed attitude toward enforcement of this law.”30 During the same period, Lenzi also became one of the featured speakers at the increasing number of antiwar demonstrations.

Despite the fact that Lenzi and Karr found themselves at odds on political and cultural matters, they still cooperated on student rights issues. In April the two published an open letter in the campus paper protesting the fact that a university senate bill calling for the reform of women’s dorm hours had been ignored by the administration. They urged students to engage in mass civil disobedience, ignore university rules, and “determine their own hours.”31

The most self-conscious attempt to pull together student rights, New Left, and counterculture concerns came with the Unity Party campaign in the spring of 1969. The party crossed racial lines, as Dwight Campbell ran for president with a white running mate, Richard Wallace. Campbell emphasized bringing different kinds of people together: “We’ve got to realize that we are all students and all our problems are intertwined. . . . To unify the campus the Party has to have people who dig people, and this is the first thing I do.”32

The party platform that served to unite the various strains focused primarily on student rights issues. Of the twelve-point program the party put forth, eight involved issues of student rights. No mention was made of the war. The effort to build a coalition of left-liberal forces proved successful, as the Unity Party gained the endorsement of the Action Party and won a landslide victory.33

Though the Unity Party sought to avoid the issue, other groups were anxious to focus on the war, especially its new, tangible symbol on campus:
the Center for Vietnamese Studies and Programs. In July 1969 President Morris and the Board of Trustees approved the creation of the center, financed by a contract with the Agency for International Development (AID) that provided $200,000 a year for five years to support the study of ways to reconstruct Vietnam after the war. Appointed as the center’s distinguished visiting professor was Wesley Fishel, who had been part of a similar program at Michigan State University, which was well known because of antiwar activist Robert Scheer’s 1966 exposé in *Ramparts* magazine. SIU students “profoundly mistrusted that Vietnamese Studies Center,” says Jim Hanson. “We were convinced . . . that it was a training center and its purpose was counterinsurgency with CIA funds.”

SDS led the criticism of the center, attacking it in the organization’s underground paper, the *Big Muddy Gazette*. In April, after the *Gazette* denounced the center while also printing a drawing of a nude Delyte Morris on its front page, university officials withdrew the permit that allowed the paper to be sold on campus. In the resultant furor, many people who did not necessarily agree with the paper’s politics spoke out in defense of its free speech rights, all of which served to put the university administration on the defensive.

As protests against the Vietnamese Studies Center (VSC) mounted, Campbell and Wallace offered the resources of student government to the antiwar movement. In late January violence broke out in anti-center demonstrations over two days, with fifteen arrests. Rhetoric escalated along with tensions, as both Campbell and Wallace denounced “the pig power structure.” In February, 200 protesters entered a meeting of the Board of Trustees and presented a list of demands. In an exchange with a board member, Wallace stated, “If we’re beaten again, we’ll have to resort to self-defense in any form necessary.” That night, demonstrators engaged police in a series of disturbances that resulted in $15,000 damage to university buildings and downtown stores.

Four days later Campbell and Wallace were suspended for their participation in the protest over dorm hours. Student rights, then, remained a central issue for the movement, and dorm hours in particular provided a locus for all three strains of the movement. In fact, were it not for the Vietnamese Studies Center, the war might never have become a focus for activism at SIU, in spite of the fact that many students were concerned about it on a very personal level. Instead, the center gave the movement a concrete target to protest against, and as such it played a significant role in bringing the three strains together. For the politicos, it provided “a sense of urgency and purpose,” an important way to “stop the war machine.” The right to protest against the
center also became a student rights issue. “Student power” activist Larry Bennett suggests that the effect of administrators and police trying to prevent demonstrations against AID and the Vietnamese Studies Center was that “the rights issue became more about personal freedom, our ability to organize and demonstrate on campus.”

That sort of challenge to personal freedom seems to be what brought in some of the party people. One such person was Bill Bojanowski, who claims he graduated with the lowest grade point average in the history of the school. During the spring of 1970, having flunked out of SIU for the second time, he was working in the cafeteria of a campus dormitory. He had a high lottery number and was in no danger of being drafted, yet he resented the presence of AID and the VSC on campus. “There were a lot of us,” says Bojanowski, “even though we weren’t political, who were against the war. I didn’t know too many students who weren’t against the war.”

SIU’s “seven days in May,” a series of demonstrations that culminated in a riot that led to 1,200 National Guard troops being sent to Carbondale, needs to be compared to the events following Kent State that took place at the hundreds of other campuses that shut down nationwide. Local grassroots participants and student organizers had very different understandings of the riots. From the point of view of the leadership, Ray Lenzi claims the events were not so much a riot as a student strike. “It was a very conscious, planned activity that was organized. The goal was to shut down the university as a statement to the state and the nation against the war in Vietnam, and even though definitely things got out of hand and got a little disorganized at times . . . there were leaders with a conscious strategy who wanted to shut SIU down.” But many observers, even those who were right in the middle of the organizing, were struck by the spontaneity of events and the way that the movement itself grew beyond anyone’s control. “Every day it was escalating . . . the marches were getting bigger and bigger . . . the movement was growing and the anger was growing,” says Doug Allen, an assistant professor and antiwar organizer. Allen, along with other New Left activists, opposed shutting down the school because it would destroy the momentum of antiwar organizing and movement building. The protests, however, created conditions that made the school closing inevitable, both because of the escalating violence and because students who had been cutting classes were worried about flunking out.

In the end the movement’s rank and file, imbued with the party culture ethic, was in little mood to listen to the voices of reason or restraint that leadership sought to provide. As Larry Vaughn remembers, during the days of rioting many students chose a strategy reminiscent of the Moo and Cackle
riots. “What we did is we divided up into groups and we would roam around
the streets and we would take bricks and we would pound police cars with all
these bricks. The police cars looked like junk cars on wheels, completely torn
up... We were just out there doing what [we] thought [we] had to do.”
Bill Bojanowski best expresses the spirit of the rank and file: “We were full of
ourselves and it was just neat we did something. We closed down the damn
school and it should have been closed down.”

While the crucible of events culminating in the student strike brought
together the various strains of the student movement at SIU, the closing of
the university revealed the movement’s rifts. When the university shut down,
thousands of students viewed it as cause for celebration. Larry Vaughn says,
“We had a huge party. People were running through the streets naked. Peo-
ple were standing on the tops of cars and driving up and down the streets.”
Bojanowski echoes Vaughn: “It was the original street party at SIU. People
were smoking dope on the street... We had our makeshift parades going
down the street. Some guy with a Nixon mask on. It was a circus atmosphere.
It was a lot of fun. Nobody got hurt... It was pretty peaceful. Everybody
was everybody’s friend.”

The more politically conscious activists had a very different response to
the closing of the university. From their point of view, it dissipated the move-
ment’s strength and destroyed the opportunity to continue organizing. Larry
Bennett, by then an SDS activist, argues that the growing involvement of the
party faction drowned out the influence of the more serious politicos and
proved counterproductive for the creation of a long-term mass movement.
“I think the pressure from the riots became more of a party and it sucked in a
lot of people who weren’t politically on board and just became like a hap-
pening, a way to be part of something that felt like a national movement.”
Bojanowski’s view from the grassroots is strikingly similar: “There was just
too much stuff to ignore it and it was sort of a movement and we all got
called up in it.”

The 1970 riots have had a significant long-term impact on the univer-
sity and its relationship with the surrounding community. Although busi-
ness owners who had their store windows broken in May 1970 may have
gone beyond “wishing SIU would go away,” as a sub-heading in the Wall
Street Journal proclaimed at the time, there remains a strong distrust of
students that rests on stereotypes that blur political activists, hippies, and
out-of-control partiers. Among the longstanding issues that, rightly or
wrongly, many people see as stemming from the 1970 riots are the universi-
ity’s party school reputation, a street party every Halloween that frequently
turns violent, a lower than average female enrollment, and continual budget problems.\textsuperscript{51}

As for the historiography of the student movement, the evidence suggests that there is no dominant narrative that fits every case, and, more significantly, that the notion of “decline” is hardly accurate or adequate to explain late sixties and early seventies student protest. For a brief moment, the party culture at SIU became politicized enough to go beyond fighting for personal freedom and student rights and, in its own way, join a larger battle for the soul of the university and the country. We need more studies at the grassroots level to determine whether there were other campuses where the party culture helped to shape the student movement. While the May 1970 riots at SIU appear in retrospect as a small piece of a large national story in which hundreds of campuses shut down, they were experienced at the time and at the grassroots as “a very local affair.”

In the wake of Kent State and the student riots sparked by the killings there, many young people dropped out of the movement, as the stakes seemed too high and the struggle too long and demanding. But former activists did not simply mourn, nor did they flock to Wall Street. Instead, they struggled in new and different ways to live out the values of the movement.\textsuperscript{52} In the meantime, universities such as SIU tried to deny, and sometimes to suppress actively, their own New Left, student rights, and party traditions.

NOTES


3. Campbell’s statement is an intriguing allusion to Jerry Farber’s classic 1965 essay, “The Student as Nigger,” an attempt by white radicals to assert their oppressed status as students. See Jerry Farber, “The Student as Nigger,” in \textit{The Student as Nigger: Essays and Stories} (New York: Pocket Books, 1969).

4. It is also worth noting that while the issue is women’s dorm hours, the visible leadership in the demonstrations is still male. There is much more to be explored and said about the gender dynamics of the movement. This is one focus of our larger project on the student movement at SIUC, but space limitations make it impossible to do justice to the issue in this article.


8. Doug Rossinow, “The New Left in the Counterculture: Hypotheses and Evidence,” *Radical History Review* 67 (Winter 1997): 79–120, argues that expressive rather than instrumental politics dominated the late sixties, and that midwestern and southern radicals played a key role in the transition from one to the other. David Farber touches on the fusion of cultural and political rebellion in “The Counterculture and the Antiwar Movement,” in *Give Peace A Chance*, ed. Melvin Small and William D. Hoover (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1992), 7–21, but some of his other work implies that the violence of the late sixties was mainly the fault of the turn toward cultural politics. See Farber, *Chicago ’68* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988). These issues can be examined more closely at the local level, as in Rossinow’s focus on Austin, Texas, in *The Politics of Authenticity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), and Kenneth J. Heineman, *Campus Wars* (New York: New York University Press, 1993). It is worth noting that the national focus and the declension model began with the history of the civil rights movement, as in Clayborne Carson, *In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), and that the shift to more local-level studies is also evident there.


11. According to Harper, Morris “loved being considered a father figure. . . . [His] concern for students and desire to support their interests in a paternalistic way
was a major obstacle to his understanding of the militant demands for student rights in the late sixties. He felt betrayed by those he had always strongly supported” (38).


13. For a history of the many confrontations on Carbondale’s “strip,” see Koplowitz, Carbondale After Dark and Other Stories, 9–51.


16. Hanson interview. Lenzi interview, July 15, 1997. Ray Lenzi claims that getting together to listen to music was “a big part of how people’s outlook was shaped.”

17. Telephone interview with Larry Bennett, April 14, 1999.


22. Author interview with Mike Harty, November 24, 1997.

23. Ibid. It is worth pointing out that the SDS National Office moved to Chicago in 1965, but SIU students still perceived a great distance between themselves and the national leadership.

24. Hanson interview.

25. Koplowitz, Carbondale After Dark and Other Stories, 16.

26. Hanson interview.

27. Harty interview.


29. Ibid.


36. For example, on April 16, 1969, the *Daily Egyptian* ran an editorial on page 4 defending the *Big Muddy Gazette*’s free speech rights next to an anti-*Gazette* cartoon that implied it was communist-controlled and obscene.


38. “Protesters Interrupt Trustees Meeting,” *Daily Egyptian*, February 21, 1970, 11. Note that this is a white student echoing Malcolm X.


41. Bennett interview.

42. Author interview with Bill Bojanowski, June 29, 1998.

43. Lenzi, “I’m on the Pavement.”

44. Allen interview. Allen was later denied tenure at SIU because of his leadership in the movement opposing the Vietnamese Studies Center. While there was some support for him on campus, the faculty generally seemed to steer clear of the student movement; they were not vocal in their opposition to the Vietnam War or in their support for Doug Allen.

45. Allen, Bennett, and Hanson interviews.

46. Vaughn, “I’m on the Pavement.”

47. Bojanowski interview.

48. Vaughn, “I’m on the Pavement.”

49. Bojanowski interview.

50. Bennett and Bojanowski interviews.

52. See for example, Richard Flacks and Jack Whalen, Beyond the Barricades: The Sixties Generation Grows Up (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989). Virtually all the people we interviewed talked about the long-term impact of this period on their lives, from their choices of profession to their lifestyles. See Lenzi, Bennett, Hanson, and Bojanowski interviews.